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The ability to understand the relation between quantities has been documented in a wide
range of species. Such quantity discrimination competences are commonly demonstrated
by a choice of the larger quantity or numerosity in a two-choice task. However, despite
their overall success, many subjects commit a surprisingly large number of errors even
in simple discriminations such as 1 vs. 3. Recently, it had been suggested that this is a
result of the testing procedure. When monkeys could choose between different quantities
of edible rewards, they showed low-level success. If, however, they chose between ined-
ible items and were rewarded with edible items, their performance increased. The same
held true if they chose between edible items but were rewarded with other edible items
(Schmitt and Fischer, 2011).This led to the suggestion that the monkeys may not have been
able to mentally separate between choice- and reward-stimuli in the initial test situation.To
investigate if this response pattern can also be found in non-primate species, we replicated
the experiment with 12 Icelandic horses kept at a private horse-riding school. Horses are
known to discriminate between quantities up to three, but are very distantly related to pri-
mates. Unexpectedly, we found only weak evidence for quantity discrimination skills and
no effect of the type of stimuli. Only some subjects reliably selected the larger quantity in
some, but not all quantity pairs. These findings are not only in contrast to the previously
conducted study on monkeys, but also to other studies on horses. From this, we conclude
that quantity discrimination competence may only be of minor importance for horses and
highlight the influence of experimental conditions on the outcome of cognitive tests.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to understand the relation (i.e., greater or smaller)
and to discriminate between two or more quantities is of partic-
ular interest in comparative cognition (see, for instance Agrillo
and Petrazzini, 2012). Quantity discrimination competences can
be used to differentiate between different amounts of items and
may be based on differences in volume, surface, etc. (e.g., Agrillo
et al., 2010b). If the discrimination is based on the numerosity
of the items rather than any on the alternative measurements,
researchers often refer to this as numerical competence (e.g., Pep-
perberg and Gordon, 2005; Beran, 2008; Agrillo et al., 2009). In
either case, such discriminatory skills can be used in different
ecological contexts such as foraging or in conflicts. For instance,
New Zealand robins, Petroica australis, used their mental repre-
sentation of numerosities to maximize the intake of retrieved
cached food (Hunt et al., 2008) and female lions, Panthera leo,
approached a group of intruders only if their own group was
larger than the intruder group (McComb et al., 1994). In gen-
eral, quantity discriminations and numerical competence have
been described in a large number of animals, ranging from chicks
Gallus gallus (Rugani et al., 2009), mosquitofish Gambusia hol-
brooki (Agrillo et al., 2009), horses Equus caballus (Uller and
Lewis, 2009), and black bears Ursus americanus (Vonk and Beran,
2012) to capuchin Cebus apella (Evans et al., 2009) and rhesus
monkeys Macaca mulatta (Flombaum et al., 2005; Brannon et al.,
2006), chimpanzees Pan troglodytes (Boyson and Berntson, 1995)
as well as corvids Corvus corax, C. corone cornix, and C. macrorhyn-
chos (Koehler, 1943; Smirnova et al., 2000; Bogale et al., 2011),
gray parrots Psittacus erithacus (Pepperberg, 1987; Pepperberg and
Gordon, 2005; Al Aïn et al., 2009), and pigeons Columba livia
(Scarf et al., 2011).
The vast majority of quantity discrimination tests rely on some
version of two-choice task, in which the subjects are confronted
with a choice between different quantities of rewards, of which
they commonly shall choose the larger quantity. In a subset of
these studies, arbitrary objects are used as stimuli (e.g., Pepper-
berg and Gordon, 2005; Beran, 2008; Agrillo et al., 2009, 2010a;
Vonk and Beran, 2012), often in conjunction with presentations on
touch screens. These procedures facilitate testing for true numer-
ical competence as it easily allows to control for confounding
variables such as the volume or surface of the stimuli (Agrillo
et al., 2010b). Other procedures use pieces of food as a reward
(e.g., Al Aïn et al., 2009; Uller and Lewis, 2009; Schmitt and Fis-
cher, 2011) or, in a few cases, different numbers of conspecifics
(e.g., Dadda et al., 2009) or nestmate surrogates (i.e., objects chicks
had been imprinted on; Rugani et al., 2009). These procedures
have the advantage of greater ecological relevance and require less
training.
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There is an interesting discrepancy in tests involving food
rewards as choice stimuli. Some studies report high discrimina-
tion performances (e.g., Evans et al., 2009 for capuchin monkeys,
Beran and Beran, 2004 for chimpanzees, or Al Aïn et al., 2009
for Gray parrots), whereas in other studies subjects performed
surprisingly poorly. For instance, Western lowland gorillas Gorilla
gorilla gorilla required training to succeed (Anderson et al., 2005);
chimpanzees, orangutans Pongo pygmaeus, olive baboons Papio
anubis, and long-tailed macaques Macaca fascicularis succeeded
in 65–70% of the trials only, even in relatively simple discrimina-
tions such as 1 vs. 2 (Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt and Fischer,
2011). Schmitt and Fischer (2011) suggested that this may be a
consequence of the usage of food as choice stimulus and reward
and highlighted two confounding and not necessarily mutually
exclusive problems: impulse control and mental representation
of choice and reward. The first issue, impulse control, arises if
the perception of food (as choice stimulus) leads to an impulsive
choice of any reward without evaluation of the two alternative
options. Problems in self-control have been reported repeatedly in
non-human animals (e.g., Stevens et al., 2005; reviewed by Faw-
cett et al., 2012). The second issue, the mental representation of
choice and reward, has been highlighted in human psychology.
Humans readily form “dual representations,” i.e., upon seeing a
picture of a famous person the picture is represented simultane-
ously as a picture and as the person that is depicted. When young
children are confronted with stimuli of high physical salience
(e.g., candies), it obstructs their ability to see them as choice item
rather than as reward (DeLoache, 2000). To illustrate this: when
3-year-old children were tested in a reversed-reward paradigm,
they performed significantly better if they had to choose between
symbols (i.e., a mouse or an elephant) than when they had to
choose between different types of candies (Carlson et al., 2005);
this has been interpreted as children’s inability to identify the two
different functions of the highly salient candies, i.e., choice stimuli
vs. reward. Thus, it seems plausible that also non-human animals
may have problems to mentally represent the food once as choice
stimulus and once as the reward (DeLoache, 2000; Shifferman,
2009).
To evaluate their hypothesis, Schmitt and Fischer (2011) used a
standard two-choice paradigm to test the quantity discrimination
abilities of olive baboons and long-tailed macaques. The authors
applied three conditions. In the first condition, raisins served as
choice and as reward. In the second condition, the monkeys were
presented with pebbles and were rewarded with the quantity of
raisins corresponding to the number of pebbles they chose. Thus,
the choice stimuli were inedible items but they were rewarded
with edible items. In the third condition edible items were used as
choice and as reward, but the subjects received not the raisins they
chose, but the same amount of other raisins. The monkeys selected
the larger quantity in all three conditions, but they performed sig-
nificantly better when they were not rewarded with the items they
had to choose. Importantly, their performance was identical in the
condition in which they chose between pebbles and in the condi-
tion in which they chose between raisins, but were rewarded with
other raisins. This suggests that the relatively poor performance
in the first condition (in which they were rewarded with the same
raisins they had chosen) cannot be explained solely by problems
with impulse control; it rather suggests that the monkeys indeed
had problems to mentally represent the raisins as two different
things at the same time, namely as choice stimulus and as reward
(Schmitt and Fischer, 2011).
We here replicated the original Schmitt and Fischer (2011) –
study with horses. The cognitive abilities of horses received
increasing attention recently: they can recognize familiar horses
and humans cross-modally (Proops et al., 2009b; Lampe and
Andre, 2012; Proops and McComb, 2012), identify the attentional
states of humans (Proops and McComb, 2010; Krüger et al., 2011),
and respond at least to some human-given social cues (McKinley
and Sambrook, 2000; Proops et al., 2010; Krüger et al., 2011).
Of more relevance for our purpose are studies demonstrating
that horses can discriminate objects of different colors (Smith
and Goldman, 1999) and sizes (Hanggi, 2003). The first claims of
numerical or even mathematical skills in horses have been refuted
and became the text-book example of behavioral cueing and the
need for adequate controls for experimenter biases (“Clever Hans”;
Pfungst, 1911); nevertheless, a recent study demonstrated that
horses can indeed discriminate between different quantities (Uller
and Lewis, 2009). In this study, an experimenter put several apples,
one by one, in two buckets. Then, holding the buckets in her hand,
the experimenter approached the horses to allow them to make a
choice. The results demonstrate that the horses managed a 1 vs. 2
and a 2 vs. 3, but not a 4 vs. 6 discrimination.
Interestingly, horses’ cognitive performances seem to be highly
susceptible to minor changes in testing conditions (see Proops
et al., 2009a and references therein), making them an interest-
ing subject for comparisons of experimental approaches. Thus,
in the present study, our intentions were twofold. First, we were
interested whether the same effect that had been described in the
monkeys (Schmitt and Fischer, 2011) would also be found in a
non-primate species. Second, we wished to expand on the previ-
ous study by Uller and Lewis (2009) on quantity discriminations
in horses; thereby we purposefully did not replicate that study in
detail, but instead applied a different methodology closely resem-
bling the monkey-study by Schmitt and Fischer. By doing so, we
hoped not only to investigate if horses could also discriminate
quantities beyond those tested by Uller and Lewis, but also to
investigate the robustness of horses’performances when a different
methodological approach is used (Proops et al., 2009a). The value
of such approaches for comparative animal cognition research
is increasingly acknowledged (e.g., Agrillo and Petrazzini, 2012;
MacLean et al., 2012) as some authors had argued that much can
be learned from subjects’ failures in cognitive tests (e.g., Thornton
and Lukas, 2012). Importantly, the goal of this approach is not to
discredit or devalue earlier studies, but to identify yet unknown
factors contributing to the subjects’ performances, which ulti-
mately can support the development of better testing regimes (e.g.,
Mulcahy and Hedge, 2012; Seed et al., 2012). For instance, after the
original finding that chimpanzees would demonstrate perspective
taking skills (Hare et al., 2001), follow-up studies revealed that
this was restricted to certain test conditions and depended, among
others, on the size of the testing compartments (Karin-D’Arcy and
Povinelli, 2002; Bräuer et al., 2007); this highlighted the impor-
tance of an so far vastly neglected factor in the design of cognitive
tasks. More recently, varying evidence for elephants’ numerical
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competencies was found, again depending on the precise testing
conditions (Irie and Hasegawa, 2012; Perdue et al., 2012).
For our study, the horses were confronted on each trial with a
choice between two different quantities, and we applied the three
conditions used by Schmitt and Fischer (2011; see above). A total
of six different quantity pairs of varying ratio (i.e., larger quan-
tity divided by smaller quantity) and quantity difference (larger
quantity minus smaller quantity) were presented to evaluate the
occurrence of two frequently observed patterns in quantity dis-
crimination tasks: first, the discriminability increases with an
increase in ratio (e.g., 2 vs. 4 is easier to solve than 2 vs. 3;
Weber’s law) and second, when keeping the ratio constant, dis-
criminations become harder when the total quantities increase
(i.e., 4 vs. 6 is harder than 2 vs. 3). Thus, particularly when ratios
are small, differences between large quantities become difficult to
assess.
Based on the published record, we expected horses to be able
to discriminate between different quantities and that their perfor-
mance would obey Weber’s law. Furthermore, we predicted that if
the horses’ performance would be influenced by the stimulus type,
their performance should be better when choosing between inedi-
ble rather than edible items. If this would be based on a facilitated
impulse control, an increased performance should be detectable
with inedible items as choice stimuli only. If, however, the horses’
mental representation of the stimuli would benefit from the sepa-
ration of food as choice stimuli and food as reward, an increased
performance could be expected in the condition in which they
would choose between different food quantities but would be
rewarded with other rewards.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
We tested 12 privately owned Icelandic horses (six gelded males,
six mares) kept at a private horse-riding school near Göttingen,
Germany. At the time of testing, the subjects were between 6 and
18 years old. The horses were housed individually in open sta-
bles and were frequently ridden. Tests were conducted between
December 2011 and February 2012. As the horses were used for
horse-riding courses, the frequency of testing depended on the
availability of open time slots. Horses were fed daily and hay
was available ad libitum. Additional feeding with grains usu-
ally occurred after riding, but tests were conducted before riding
lessons. However, some of the horses were privately owned and,
unbeknown to us, the owners may have grain-fed their horses on
some days prior to testing. Tests were conducted once to thrice a
week. Each horse participated not more than once per day; sessions
were conducted between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m.
GENERAL PROCEDURE
Testing was conducted in the center of a large indoor riding arena.
We built a corridor through which the horses would approach the
setup. This corridor was 7.4 m long, 1.70 m wide in the beginning
and opened after 3.30 m to a width of 3.90 m (Figure 1). To the
sides the corridor was confined by barrier tape, but was open to
the back and to the front. At the end of the corridor we posi-
tioned a 2.20 m long bench; at both ends of the bench we put a
flat bucket upside down (diameter: 30 cm) on which the stimuli
a
b c d
e
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup. a: Exit, b: corridor, c: multi-jump block, d:
bench, e: bucket.
were presented. The distance between the two buckets was 1.35 m.
In front of the bench and equidistantly between the two buck-
ets we positioned a multi-jump block (1 m long and 0.60 m high)
made of plastic. This block served as hindrance for the horses to
approach the experimenter and induced them to approach one of
the buckets.
Each trial involved two experimenters. Experimenter 1 (Yuki
Henselek) sat behind the bench, baited the buckets, and rewarded
the horses. Experimenter 2 led the horse. Three different persons
served as experimenter 2 (two females, one male, all of compa-
rable age). All horses were tested with all experimenters. At the
beginning of a trial, experimenter 2 led the horse from the back
of the arena into the corridor to the point where the corridor
widened. This was defined as the release point. Experimenter 2 led
the horse on its left side; at the release point, the experimenter let
the horse go and made a few steps back to stand behind the horse.
Five horses had a significant side bias (according to a binomial test
with P < 0.05) and three horses chose preferentially the bucket to
their left and two horses the bucket to their right. Thus, it seems
unlikely that position of experimenter 2 biased the horses to select
one side consistently. The horse approached the bench to make
a choice. After the horse had chosen, experimenter 2 approached
and led it outside of the corridor to the backside of the arena.
There, the horse was led on a pre-defined, eight-shaped course
through the arena to counteract potential side-biases (Proops
et al., 2010). During this, experimenter 1 prepared the next trial,
which started when experimenter 2 and the horse re-entered the
corridor.
PRE-TEST
The pre-test was introduced to ensure that the subjects were famil-
iar with having to make a choice. On each trial, experimenter 1
put one apple slice (approx. 1/8 of an apple) on one of the buckets,
whereas the other bucket remained empty. Because of the high
olfactory acuity of horses (Saslow, 2002) we decided to control for
olfactory cues by hiding four slices of apple under each bucket.
The location of the single apple slice (right or left) was random-
ized with the stipulation that it was not on the same side in more
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than in two consecutive trials. Although the horse was distracted
by going the eight-shaped course it could not be excluded that the
subject may have seen the experimenter’s movement toward the
bucket during baiting. Therefore, experimenter 1 held her arms
extended from her body and moved both arms simultaneously to
both buckets. Nevertheless, because of the distance between the
buckets, the experimenter touched the buckets sequentially; we
randomized whether the experimenter touched the baited bucket
first or second. After the baiting, experimenter 1 held her arms and
hands attached to her body, lowered her head, and turned around
by 180˚ to avoid giving unintentional cues. The horse was scored
as having made a choice if it overstepped the imaginary horizontal
line of the block with at least one hoof (see Figure 1).
One session consisted of 10 trials. When subjects were success-
ful in nine out of ten trials in a single session or were correct on
80% of their last 20 trials (binomial test, two-tailed, in both cases
P < 0.05), they were advanced to the test.
TEST
The general test procedure was identical to the pre-test with the
following exceptions: at the beginning of each session the horse
was led through the corridor and to each of the two buckets
once. After this warm-up, the test began. Here, the subjects had to
choose between different quantities of rewards. All rewards were of
comparable size and consequently, number was positively corre-
lated with several other parameters (e.g., volume and surface). We
presented six different quantity pairs representing three different
ratios. The quantity differences ranged from 1 to 4 (see Table 1).
Each session consisted of twelve trials and each quantity pair
was presented twice per session in randomized order. Further-
more, we conducted three different conditions:
Condition “food”: the apple slices served as choice stimuli and as
reward; i.e., the horses retrieved the apple pieces from the bucket.
Condition “wood”: small wooden blocks (same size as the apple
slices) served as choice stimuli. As soon as a horse had made a
choice, the experimenter removed the wooden blocks and pro-
vided the horse with an amount of apple slices corresponding
to the number of wooden block the horse had chosen. The rea-
soning behind this task was that if the horses had understood
to approach the larger quantity, they should continue to do so
even if non-food items served as stimuli (and thus behave like
the monkeys in the original study).
Condition “food replaced”: apple slices served as choice stimuli,
but subjects were rewarded with other pieces of apple. Thus, as
soon as a horse had made a choice, the experimenter removed
the apple slices and provided the horse with an amount of apple
slices corresponding to the number of apple pieces the horse had
chosen.
Table 1 | Quantity pairs used in the experiment, grouped by the ratios.
Ratio 1:2 1:3 2:3
Quantity pairs 1:2 (1) 1:3 (2) 2:3 (1)
2:4 (2) 2:6 (4) 4:6 (2)
Values in parenthesis represent the value differences.
During the first session, we encountered that we had to mod-
ify the setup in two ways. First, to facilitate the positioning of the
choice stimuli and the replacement of the choice stimuli with the
rewards, the choice stimuli were positioned on trays (same diame-
ter and color as the buckets). Thus, the experimenter prepared the
stimuli on the trays and positioned the trays with a single move-
ment on the two buckets. As soon as the horse made its choice,
the entire tray was removed and the horse rewarded. Second, it
turned out that the experimenter needed to be orientated toward
the horse (rather than turning her back toward them) to allow
the experimenter to remove the trays in time. To avoid cuing,
the experimenter was looking down until the horse had made its
choice. Two horses (one in condition “food” and one in condi-
tion “food replaced”) were first tested in the procedure described
for the pre-test and were tested with this new procedure from the
beginning of their second session. However, as their performance
did not differ between the two treatments, we did not repeat the
first session for these two horses.
Conditions were presented en bloc and we conducted four ses-
sions for each condition. Because of time constraints, each horse
was tested in two of the three conditions only. We formed three
groups (group 1 tested in conditions “food” and “wood,” group 2
in conditions “food” and “food replaced,” and group 3 in condi-
tions “wood” and “food replaced”) and randomly assigned four
horses to each of the groups. Within each group, half of the horses
began with one condition and the other horses began with the
other condition. Thus, each horse received eight sessions with a
total of 96 trials (12 trials per session).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Sessions were video-recorded and analyzed from tape. Due to tech-
nical problems, the performance on 3 days had to be scored live.
Twenty percentage of all sessions were re-coded by a second person
and the inter-observer reliability was excellent (Cohen’s K = 1).
We identified a variety of task-related factors that may have
influenced the performance of the horses, ranging from the differ-
ent conditions to the inevitable use of several persons assisting in
the role of experimenter 2. We used a general linear mixed model
(GLMM) to test the influence of these factors. This approach
has several advantages: first, the influence of each factor can be
assessed while keeping the other factors constant. Second, this
approach is robust to missing values (note that each horse partic-
ipated in two of the three conditions only); third, it reduces the
number of statistical tests and thereby the risk of a type I error.
We used choice of the larger quantity as the binomially distrib-
uted dependent variable. Condition, quantity pair, trial number
within each session, identity of experimenter 2, location of the
higher quality (left/right), and the order of touching the buckets
(positioning the larger or the smaller quantity first) were entered
as fixed factors; subject ID was entered as random factor. In con-
cordance with standard stepwise model reduction procedure, we
sequentially removed all fixed terms in order of decreasing signifi-
cance, whereby the least significant term was determined after each
removal step (Galwey, 2006; Garamszegi et al., 2009). Deletion of
fixed terms continued until only terms with a significance value
below 0.1 remained. This was then considered the final model.
Excluded terms were re-entered one by one into the final model
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to confirm that they did not explain a significant part of the
variation.
Individual performances were assessed using binomial tests. To
compare the group performance against the chance level, we used
one-sample t -tests or Wilcoxon-tests, depending on the distribu-
tion of the data (according to a Shapiro–Wilk – test for normality).
To test if the horses’ performances differed between different ratios
or quantity differences, we used repeated measures ANOVAs; we
applied the Greenhouse–Geisser correction in case of a lack of
sphericity (according to Mauchly’s test). Sex differences were ana-
lyzed using a t -test. Finally, Pearson correlations were calculated to
assess performance changes over the course of the experiment, age
effects, and a relationship between test and pre-test performance.
All tests were conducted two-tailed with alpha set to 0.05. Tests
were conducted using SPSS19.
RESULTS
Nine of 12 subjects reached the criterion in the Pre-Test and
were advanced to the test. Successful subjects required 3.77± 2.49
(x ± SD) sessions to reach the criterion. One horse in each group
stopped participating and refused to make a choice.
The GLMM did not reveal a significant contribution to the
subjects’ performance by any of the factors (see Table 2 for the
full model). This suggests that in contrast to our expectations
the horses’ performance was independent from the stimulus pre-
sentation (P = 0.606), i.e., whether the horses chose between the
rewards they were going to receive, inedible items, or edible items
Table 2 | GLMM test statistics of the full model.
Factor df F P
Condition 2 0.501 0.606
Quantity pair 5 0.333 0.893
Trial number within session 11 0.193 0.661
Identity of experimenter 2 1 0.105 0.745
Location of higher quantity 1 1.711 0.191
Order of touching the buckets 1 0.193 0.660
that were going to be replaced (Figure 2A). Consequently, we
pooled the conditions for subsequent analysis. Even more surpris-
ingly, the performance did not differ between the various quantity
pairs (P = 0.893); nevertheless, we found an above chance per-
formance for the presumably easiest 1 vs. 3 – pair (one-sample
t -test, T = 3.162, df= 8, P = 0.013), but one needs to bear in
mind that the median success rate was below 60% (Figure 2B)
and the observed effect could be a chance finding. The against
chance comparisons for all other quantity pairs turned out to
be non-significant (one-sample t -tests, P > 0.249; Wilcoxon-Test,
P = 0.672; Figure 2B).
Our results furthermore fail to demonstrate an effect of ratio
(rm ANOVA, N = 9, P = 0.718, F 2,16= 0.339) or quantity differ-
ence (rm ANOVA, N = 9, P = 0.871, F 1.255,10.038= 0.055) on the
subjects’ choice behavior. On an individual level, one subject each
selected the larger quantity in the 2 vs. 3 – pair, the 2 vs. 4 – pair,
and the 2 vs. 6 – pair (in all cases 13 out of 16 trials correct; bino-
mial test: P = 0.021). Two of these three horses also had a marginal
preference for the larger quantity (12 out of 16 correct, P = 0.077)
in the 2 vs. 6 and the 1 vs. 2 – pair, respectively.
Finally, we neither found a link between pre-test and test-
performance (Pearson, N = 9, P = 0.202, R= 0.469) nor an
improvement over the course of the experiment (Pearson correla-
tion, N = 8, P = 0.959, R=−0.022). Similarly, males and females
performed similarly (t -test, N = 9, P = 0.696, T =−0.408), but
we found a somewhat weaker performance in older subjects (Pear-
son, N = 9, P = 0.014, R=−0.774; Figure 3). Yet, again the effect
was not very strong and mainly driven by the oldest subject; con-
sequently, the strength of this conclusion should be treated with
caution.
DISCUSSION
In contrast to our expectations and to a previous report (Uller and
Lewis, 2009) we did not find evidence that horses will discriminate
between two different quantities. Only a few subjects selected the
larger quantity consistently, but only in a subset of the quantity
pairs. Unfortunately, no clear pattern emerged, as some of these
subjects solved presumably more difficult discriminations (e.g., 2
vs. 4) but failed in presumably more simple discriminations (e.g., 1
FIGURE 2 | Horses’ test performances. (A) Percentage of correct choices in each of the conditions. (B) Percentage of correct choices in each of the six
quantity pair discriminations. Box plots show median and 25th and 75th, percentiles, whiskers show 10th- and 90th percentiles and dots represent outliers.
Horizontal line represents chance level.
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FIGURE 3 | Relationship between age of the subjects and choice
accuracy.
vs. 3). As quantity pairs were presented in randomized order vary-
ing degrees of motivation appear unlikely to explain these findings.
Interestingly, the horses were indifferent to the type of choice
stimuli that were presented, i.e., they were not more or less success-
ful when they chose between slices of apple than when they chose
between wooden blocks. In a previous study, long-tailed macaques
and olive baboons showed a superior performance when they were
not rewarded with the same edible items they had to choose from
(Schmitt and Fischer, 2011); this was interpreted as evidence that
the monkeys may have problems with mentally representing the
same edible items as two different things, i.e., as choice stimuli
and as reward. Due to the at chance performance of the horses,
we cannot draw any conclusions about how the horses may have
mentally represented the choice stimuli.
Despite finding mainly null results, we believe that these results
nevertheless may be of interest for researchers interested in com-
parative cognition. We refrain from claiming that our results
provide sufficient evidence to assume a lack of quantity discrimi-
nation skills in horses. Previous studies demonstrated that horses
discriminate between objects of different sizes (i.e., showing dis-
crimination of continuous quantities; Hanggi, 2003) as well as
discrete quantities such as 1 vs. 2 and 2 vs. 3 (Uller and Lewis,
2009). And indeed, some of our horses solved these as well as
other quantity discriminations. However, we did not find a robust
above chance performance on the group level. Yet, our problems
to demonstrate quantity discriminations in the horses are in line
with other reports of horses’ high susceptibility to changes in test-
ing conditions (see Proops et al., 2009a and references therein).
Whereas this alone is interesting (e.g., Agrillo and Petrazzini, 2012;
MacLean et al., 2012), it would be preferable to identify the source
of the different results. Unfortunately, we cannot identify a single
cause, but in the following we will closely examine the differ-
ences between the study by Uller and Lewis (2009) and our study.
Ultimately, we hope that this will be helpful for other researchers
interested in quantity discriminations in horses (or other animals)
to refine their methodological approaches and/or to develop new
ideas and research questions.
In contrast to Uller and Lewis (2009), who tested a large num-
ber of horses at seven different locations throughout Essex, we
tested a small group of horses only, housed at a single location in
Germany. Because of this, each horse was tested only once in the
previous study, whereas our subjects were tested repeatedly. It may
be possible that Uller and Lewis’ horses were more motivated or
that our horses may have become satiated over the course of the
session. However, we did not find any evidence for performance
decreases, neither within nor across sessions; yet, it is noteworthy
that our horses took more time to choose on later trials within
sessions (Yuki Henselek, pers. obs.).
In contrast to Uller and Lewis (2009), we tested Icelandic horses
only. We are not aware of any studies reporting differences in the
cognitive abilities of different breeds of horses, but mules (hybrids
between horses and donkeys) performed better than ponies and
donkeys in a learning task (Proops et al., 2009a); thus, there is a
potential for cognitive differences between horse breeds. Notewor-
thy, dog breeds have been suggested to differ in cognitive abilities
(e.g., Wobber et al., 2009; Jakovcevic et al., 2010). For instance,
larger dogs seem to be more responsive to human pointing cues
than smaller dogs (Helton and Helton, 2010), and various expla-
nations have been raised to explain this difference: larger breeds
may have been selected for working with humans and thus being
more responsive to human pointing (Wobber et al., 2009), may
possess a larger visual acuity or may simply have more experience
with human gestures (Helton and Helton, 2010). Another differ-
ence was that Uller and Lewis conducted their tests in the subjects’
home stables, whereas we tested the horses in a test court inside
a riding arena. Even though our setup may have been new to the
subjects, the general surroundings were familiar for all horses and
none of our subjects showed signs of distress. Horses in other stud-
ies using setups comparable to ours demonstrated their cognitive
skills in a variety of tasks (e.g., Proops and McComb, 2010, 2012;
Krüger et al., 2011), and we consider it unlikely that the general test
surroundings can explain the different findings. Uller and Lewis
offered entire apples that were put sequentially into buckets. We,
in contrast, used apple slices only and positioned them simulta-
neously on two trays. Horses’ visual acuity is lower than humans’
(Timney and Keil, 1992), and consequently our presentation style
may have been less conspicuous and demanded more attention
to assess the number of items. Still, the apparent success of some
subjects on some discriminations indicates that the horses could
still see the difference. Furthermore, as one of our reviewers has
pointed out, “apples may be natural objects categorized by horses
in countable sets” and this may have facilitated the task for them.
Unfortunately, whenever only a small number of horses are avail-
able and repeated trials per sessions are required, rewarding with
entire apples is impossible because it could lead to rapid satiation.
In future studies, an elegant solution to circumvent this problem
could be to use artificial apples (such as those used by Uller and
Lewis) as stimuli, but slices of apple as reward. Lastly, apples were
baited out of sight in the Uller and Lewis study, whereas in our test
the apples were visible during the entire trial. Speculatively, the
hiding of the apples may have induced the horses to rely more on
memory processes than purely perceptual processes, and this may
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have primed the horses’ attention toward the quantity of apples in
each bucket.
Despite the possibility that some or all of the above mentioned
factors may have contributed, we believe that two other points may
be of particular importance: first, Uller and Lewis approached the
horses while holding the buckets in their hands, whereas in our
study, the horses had to approach the setup while the rewards
rested at the ends of a 2.2 m long bench. Second, in our pre-test
the horses learned to distinguish a tray with an apple from an
empty tray, whereas others (including Schmitt and Fischer, 2011)
had used pairs of stimuli with large quantity differences between
them (e.g., 8 vs. 1). Theoretically, our horses may have learned
to approach a tray with an apple rather than the tray with more
apples, which may have disrupted their performance. For future
studies it could be an alternative to conduct pre-training with a
discrimination task in which subjects should discriminate between
two quantities rather than training them to choose between one vs.
zero. Zero has a special role in numerical competence and quantity
discrimination tasks as it has the cardinal characteristic of “noth-
ing” or “absence of items” which is more difficult to understand,
even for chimpanzees (Biro and Matsuzawa, 2001).
Lastly, even though we and Uller and Lewis (2009) found at
least tentative evidence for quantity discrimination abilities in a
food-choice task, it may be worth discussing whether quantity
discrimination tasks with food as stimuli are relevant for an ani-
mal that feeds on grass. A lack of ecological relevance may at
least explain the lack of robustness of the animals’ performance.
Equids are highly social animals (Linklater, 2000), whose social
organization has been characterized by fission-fusion dynamics
(Fischhoff et al., 2007). They recognize other individuals (Proops
et al., 2009b) and dominance relationships have been shown to
influence foraging decisions (Krüger and Flauger, 2008). It seems
plausible that not only the identity, but also the number of herd
members may influence foraging decisions of horses and future
studies may take this into account. For instance, single female mos-
quitofish prefer to approach the larger of two shoals (Dadda et al.,
2009), demonstrating the relevance of quantity and numerical
discriminations in social processes.
In conclusion, using a foraging task we found only very lim-
ited evidence for quantity discrimination competences in horses,
which is in contrast to a previous study (Uller and Lewis, 2009).
Even though we do not doubt that horses are capable of differen-
tiating between quantities, our study suggests that their compe-
tencies may be restricted to certain contexts and test conditions.
This highlights the validity and importance of replication studies
(Agrillo and Petrazzini, 2012; Perdue et al., 2012) to increase our
understanding of the robustness of cognitive skills of non-human
animals.
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